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Characterising expenditure as revenue or
capital — is the distinction becoming clearer?
Michael Blissenden UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY, Dr Paul Kenny FLINDERS
UNIVERSITY and Sylvia Villios UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE
The recent High Court decision in AusNet Transmis-
sion Group Pty Ltd v FCT1 which was an appeal from
the Full Federal Court decision known as SPI PowerNet
Pty Ltd v FCT2 has again confirmed the general prin-
ciples concerning the distinction between characterising
an expense as revenue or capital. The real issue though
appears to relate to how to apply such well known
principles to modern commercial situations.
Background
The following background to the facts of the case is
drawn from the article by Bill Mavropoulos in ATLB
2(4).3 It should also be noted that SPI PowerNet
changed its name to AusNet Transmission group.
The Victorian Government, through their Electricity
Commission, originally owned the businesses that pro-
vide Victorians with electricity. In the 1990s the gov-
ernment decided to privatise part of these businesses. In
order to examine relevant outgoings, it is important to
gain a broad understanding of the way this privatisation
process was conducted.
The first thing to understand is, broadly, who owned
the electricity businesses before the privatisation. The
Electricity Commission originally owned three related
businesses as shown in the diagram below:
The businesses did three things:
• generated electricity;
• transmitted it to where it is used; and
• distributed it as appropriate.
This issue of deductibility arose with reference to the
privatisation of the transmission business. In anticipa-
tion of the privatisation, a state owned company (Power
Net Victoria Pty Ltd (PNV)) was set up. A licence in
respect of the rights to run the transmission business was
provided to the state owned company.
The licence asset was then sold to the taxpayer (SPI
PowerNet). However, a number of key events occurred
prior to the sale of the license to SPI PowerNet. First, an
impost was declared on the holder of transmission
licences for a finite period of time in Victorian legisla-
tion (s 163AA of the Electricity Industry Act 1933
(Vic)). This impost was broadly designed to ensure a
privatised transmission business did not earn too much
profit from the transmission business in question. Sec-
ond, this impost became a condition precedent to the
contract and warranties were made in respect of this
obligation by the parent company of SPI PowerNet
before the asset sale agreement could be executed. This
can be represented diagrammatically below:
The transmission licence imposts were then the
subject of protracted legal argument in relation to
whether they were deductible under s 8–1 of the Income
Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth) (ITAA 97). The Full
Federal Court held, by majority, that the imposts in
question were capital in nature. The High Court granted
special leave to appeal and also ordered that the appel-
lants name be changed to AusNet Transmission Group
Pty Ltd for the court’s record.
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High Court decision — overview
The High Court, by a majority of 4–1, dismissed the
appeal. French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ delivered a joint
judgment holding that the impost imposed on AusNet, as
the holder of an electricity transmission licence pursuant
to a state legislative framework, should be characterised
as capital and hence precluded from deductibility under
s 8–1 of the ITAA 97.
The joint judgment only dealt with the question of the
characterisation of the payment of the impost as being
capital in nature. As the joint judgment held that the
payments made were capital in nature (which was the
basis of the appeal by AusNet) then there was no need to
determine whether the payments satisfied the positive
requirement of s 8–1 of the ITAA 97. Only the dissent-
ing judgment of Nettle J dealt with the positive require-
ments of s 8–1. In [132]–[135] Nettle J dealt with the
contention that the payments were not incurred in the
gaining or producing of assessable income. His Honour
made short work of the contention by the Commissioner
that the charges were not incurred in the gaining or
producing of assessable income because they were
calculated by reference to AusNet’s expected profits. It
was clear, according to Nettle J, that this line of
reasoning should be rejected outright and that it was
quite obvious that, as the holder of a licence, AusNet
was bound to pay the charges for business purposes.
Although the majority judgments do not deal with the
issue of the positive limbs of s 8–1, it seems to be quite
evident that the particular requirement had been satis-
fied. In particular it is evident in the judgment of Gageler
J that the underlying rationale for the payment of the
charges was in relation to the commercial context within
which the specific expenditure was made, including the
commercial purposes of the taxpayer in having become
subjected to any liability that is discharged by the
making of that expenditure.4
Capital/revenue distinction
The importance of the High Court decision lies in the
discussion concerning the distinction between capital
and revenue for s 8–1 purposes. The majority joint
judgment made reference to the well-known passages
about the characterisation of capital and revenue laid out
by Dixon J in Associated Newspapers Ltd v FCT5
(Associated Newspapers) and interestingly made refer-
ence to the fact that both parties relied on the well-
established principles.
Of real interest is the fact that the majority joint
judgment then focused on the clarifying comments by
Dixon J in Hallstroms Pty Ltd v FCT6 that the distinction
depends upon what the expenditure is calculated to
effect, from a practical and business point of view.7 Such
an emphasis on the practical and business point of view
is reflected in the decisive reasoning by the majority
joint judgment. Their Honours stated that:8
AusNet did not pay the charges in order to reimburse the
State for excess revenue it might generate as licence holder.
From a practical and business point of view, the assumption
of the liability to make the expenditure was calculated to
effect the acquisition of the transmission licence and the
other assets the subject of the Asset Sale Agreement.
Of more interest is the approach by Gageler J on the
same point. His Honour made it clear throughout the
judgment that the distinction depends upon what the
expenditure is calculated to effect from a practical and
business point of view.9 In determining that the payment
was of a capital nature, Gageler J stated: “In my view,
from a practical and business perspective, the expendi-
ture was expenditure which AusNet was required to
make in order to acquire the transmission licence and
other assets.”10 Even the dissenting judgment of Nettle J
was premised on the practical and business point of
view.11
For practitioners advising business taxpayers, the
High Court judgment has strongly reinforced the prac-
tical and business approach and has given clear guidance
that this is the appropriate analysis required. This is
particularly the situation where there is no clear author-
ity on point, as was the situation in the AusNet case. So
although each matter is dependent upon the particular
facts and circumstances of that case, it is considered that
the High Court is signalling a clear approach to be taken
for business taxpayers which builds upon the well-
known and universally applied principles identified by
Dixon J in Associated Newspapers.
Characterisation of the expenditure —
statutory or contractual obligation
This is a critical aspect of the case. AusNet’s propo-
sition was that the total purchase price, which did not
include the s 163AA charges, was the amount expended
by AusNet to acquire the assets. The licence fees were
described as future licence fees, payable by the buyer,
pursuant to the contractual obligation of the asset sale
agreement.
The majority joint judgment rejected this argument.
Instead by entering the asset sale agreement, the tax-
payer assumed the statutory liability under s 163AA of
the Electricity Industry Act. By agreeing to acquire the
transmission licence and the other assets, there was an
acceptance of the statutory liability as imposed under the
legislation. Gageler J was very clear on this point. His
Honour agreed with:12
… the joint reasons for the majority judgment that cl 13.3
(d) [of the asset sale agreement] imposed a contractual
obligation on Ausnet to make the expenditure which was
independent of the statutory liability imposed on AusNet
under s 163AA of the Electricity Act.
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The statutory liability was applicable to whoever held
the transmission licence and it was “an ‘impost’ rel-
evantly payable by the holder of the Transmission
Licence to the Treasurer in amounts and at times
specified in the Order in Council”.13 The holding of a
transmission licence was a condition precedent to the
completion of the asset sale agreement. As was said by
the majority in their joint judgment:14
The promise [in cl 13.3(d) of the asset sale agreement] was
consideration moving from AusNet … and was necessary
to secure not only the transmission licence but the other
assets that were the subject of the sale.
Again “from a practical and business point of view,
the assumption of the liability to make the expenditure
was calculated to effect the acquisition of the transmis-
sion licence and the other assets… The transmission
licence was an intangible asset, but was properly viewed
as part of the structure of the business. Without it,
acquisition of the rest of the assets was pointless”.15
In short the imposts, whenever they were levied, were
a direct consequence of the cost to AusNet of securing
acquisition of the transmission licence and other assets.
The obligation to pay the imposts was inherently linked
to the statutory requirement that, to run an electricity
business, there was a need to have a transmission
licence. Those imposts were to be payable by the holder
of the transmission licence, in amounts and at times
specified in the Order in Council and were not a periodic
payment referable to the holding of the transmission
licence.
Conclusion
The High Court decision has confirmed the principles
to be applied in characterising expenditure as either
capital or revenue. In particular the practical and busi-
ness perspective of the expenditure should be emphasised
and the commercial context in which the payment has
been made. Practitioners would do well to take heed of
this approach when advising business clients.
The High Court decision is also important in recognis-
ing that a statutory requirement, as a condition precedent
to a contractual obligation, can be the cause of the
present and existing obligation in respect of the outgoing
and that the method concerning the amounts and timing
of the imposts, as specified by the legislative framework,
does not make the expenditure a recurring revenue
payment. This is an important lesson for taxpayers and
their advisers.
This paper has been subject to an independent
review.
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